Johnson Tire Service Inc. v. Thorn, Inc. : Appellant\u27s Reply Brief by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1979
Johnson Tire Service Inc. v. Thorn, Inc. : Appellant's
Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Layne T. Rushforth; Jackman & Associates; Attorney for Appellant;
Steven E. Stewart; Attorney for Respondent;
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Johnson Tire Service v. Thorn, Inc., No. 16625 (Utah Supreme Court, 1979).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/1907
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THORN, INC. , a Ui:ah 
corporation, 
Defenaant, 
Respondent & 
Cross-Appellant. 
No.16,625 
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HOU. DAVID SA!1, JUDGE 
STEVEN Ii. STEWART 
Suite 450, The Chancellor Bldg. 
220 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorney for Respondent & 
Cross-Appellant, 
Thorn, Inc. 
LAYNE T. RUSHFORTH 
JACKMAN & ASSOCIATES 
Suite 300, Temple View Terrace 
1325 South 800 l:ast 
Orem, UT 84057 
Attorney for Appellant & 
Cross-Respondent, 
Johnson '.i:'ire Service, Inc. 
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I 
DESIGUATION OF PARTIES 
For convenience, and to conform with the style used 
by the respondent in its brief, the plaintiff, appellant, and 
cross-respondent, Johnson Tire Serivce, Inc., will be designated j' 
throughout this Brief as "Johnson", and the defendallt, respondent, :I, 
and cross-appellant, Thorn, Inc., will be designated as "Thorn". 
FAC?UAL CLARIFICATIOUS 
1. The Affidavit of Dennis o. Weir, an executive 
Vice-President of Thorn, was inadequate to controvert any of the 
factual allegations made by Johnson, since Mr. Weir was never 
involved with Johnson or with Thorn's contractual relationship 
with Johnson. The District Court concluded in its Findings of 
Fact that the fact as outlined on Johnson's pleadings "have not 
been controverted by the defendant." Any unresolved questions 
of fact were, by the nature of the Summary Judgment rendered, 
determined by the District Court to be immaterial. 
2. The Purchase Order sent by Thorn to Johnson (a 
copy of which is the Appendix of Thorn's Brief) does not contain 
the entire "Contract" between the parties. As Thorn contends, 
said Purchase Order does not contain a provision for ti1e payment 
of interest, costs, or attorney's fees. It should be pointed out 
however that this Purchase Order does not contain a provision 
relating to the purchase price of the goods. Johnson's form of 
Acknowledgment and Acceptance contains all of such terms. (R. 4). 
-1-
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3. Jerry '!'horn, President of Thorn, Inc. , did object 
to the interest rate of 18% per annum, but only did so after a 
period of at least four years during which period all payments, 
by '!'horn were applied, without Thorn's objection, first to intej 
est and then to principle. (R. 18). 
4. Johnson entered into a Stipulation that Byron 
Hobbs was not an agent of Thorn. This was a Stipulation of Fae 
and NOT a Stipulation of Law which was made to avoid a fruitles 
hearing on the question regarding the agency of Byron Hobbs, 
since investigation by Johnson's counsel had lead to the conclu 
sion that Proof of Agency would be virtually impossible, and 
since the question of agency was irrelevant under the provision 
of Section 70A-2-207 of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code. 
-2-
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REPLY ARGUMENTS 
POINT ONE: A STIPULATION AS TO THE FACTS DOES NOT 
PREVENT JOHNSON FROM APPEALING ON A QUESTION OF LAW. 
The Stipulation, attached as an exhibit in the Appen-
dix hereto, specifically provides that the Stipulation: "Shall 
not constitute a waiver of or in any way effect either party's 
right to appeal the L-Distric~ Court's Conclusions of Law and 
any portion of the Judgment based thereon." 
After due investigation, Johnson stipulated that 
Byron Hobbs was not an Agent of Thor·n. The District Court's 
previous ruling (cited on page 4 of Thorn's Brief) had estab-
lished the basic Conclusions of Law which the Court had reached. 
When it appeared that a hearing on the question of the 
agency of Byron Hobbs (who had signed the principal invoice 
for Thorn) would be fruitless, counsel for Johnson, while on a 
conference telephone call with the District Court and counsel 
for Thorn, inquired of the Court how to preserve the question 
of Law on Appeal without having a hearing at which Johnson had 
no evidence to present. The Court and counsel for both parties 
concluded to use the Stipulation which was prepared by Johnson's 
counsel and signed by both parties. 
Thorn's argument is that Johnson, in order to preserve 
the Question of Law for appeal, should have had a hearing on the 
-3-
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factual question, regardless of the available evidence and 
regardless of the truth. The Stipulation made was a Stipula-
tion of Fact only, and although it was made with full view to 
its consequences based on the District Court's previous ruling! 
'! 
it was made without Stipulation or Waiver with respect to the 
Question of Law which the District Court had previously decidea
1 
This Appeal by Johnson is timely and proper. 
POINT TWO: THORN FAILED 'I'O ADDRESS I'l'SELF TO THE KEY 
ISSUES RAISED IN JOHNSON'S BRIEF. 
Johnson's chief argument is that there was a ContracJ 
I 
between it and 'l'horn which provided for the sale of tires at a1 
agreed-upon price which would be paid under specified terms of 
credit (including interest at 18% per annum, Court costs, and 
attorney's fees), which terms of credit became part of the agr~ 
ment by operation of Section 70A-2-207 of the Utah Uniform 
I 
Commercial Code. That provision, the provision of Section 7DA1 
710 of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code (relating to incidental 
damages), and the Utah Uniform Commercial Code as a whole, 
indicate the statutory intent to make the non-breaching party 
whole and to reimburse said party for all commercially reasonav 
expendituresincurred in seeking its remedies. Thorn's Brief 
evades the chief issue and focuses only on a minor point therd 
-4-
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While it is true that attorney's fees are not to be 
awarded unless there is a statutory or contractual provision to 
the contrary L22 Am.Jur.2dDamages, § 16~, in this case Section 
70A-2-207 of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code makes the attorney's 
fees part of the contract as between these parties. That section 
of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code should apply in this case 
because none of the exceptions to that statute exists here. Thorn 
has failed, both in the District Court as well as in its Brief, 
to suggest even one exception to Section 70A-2-207 of the Utah 
Uniform Commercial Code which should apply. 
POINT THREE: THORN'S COUHTER-APPEAL AS TO INTEREST IS 
IMPROPER BECAUSE THE STATEMENT OF THORN'S POINTS ON APPEAL WAS 
NOT TIMELY FILED. 
If an appellant fails to timely file the appropriate 
Notice of Appeal, appellant's Appeal will be dismissed for lack 
of jursidcition. Rule 73(a) U.R.C.P.; Watson v. Anderson, 
29 Utah 2d 36, 504 P.2d 1003 (1973). 
In this case, Thorn's Statement of Points on Appeal 
was not filed until on or after September 4, 1979. This was 
twenty-six days after Johnson filed its Notice of Appeal and 
twenty-two days after Johnson filed its Statement of Points on 
Appeal. Thorn never requested an extention of time with respect 
to its Statement of Points on Appeal. 
-5-
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Although Thorn may argue that Rule 74(b) requires 
no Notice of Appeal, that Rule specifically requires that in 
lieu thereof a Statement of Points must be filed on time as 
specified in Rule 75 U.R.C.P. which provides for ten days. 
If an Appeal will be dismissed for want Of jurisdic-
ti on for the appellant's failure to file a Notice Of Appeal 
within the prescribed period, a respondent's Counter- or Cross-
Appeal should be dismissed for its failure to file a Statement 
of Points on Appeal within the prescribed period. ?his is the· 
Rule in other jurisdictions, and should also be the Rule in 
Utah. Sadler v. State, 401 P.2d 848, 66 Wash.2d 215 (1965). 
POINT FOUR: THORN'S COURSE OF DEALINGS WITH JOHNSON 
' PRECLUDES THEIR ARGUMENT THAT JOHNSOU IS HOT ENTITLED TO INTEl 
AT THE RATE OF 18% PER ANNUM. 
The District Court determined that there was no issue\ 
of material fact raised by Thorn's Affidavit. First, the Affid 
vit submitted by Thorn (contained in the Appendix of Thorn's 
Brief) was that of Dennis Weir, who was never shown to be 
involved in Thorn's dealing with Joimson, and therefore was 
I 
inadequate. The statement in said Affidavit that "Affiant neve:\ 
discussed with any representative of L_-Johnso!:.7 the matters of, 
< 
payment of counsel fees, interest or the time in which L_Johnso~ 
expected the bill to be paid" is meaningless where said Affiant 
-6-
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was not involved in the matter at any stage until after suit 
by Johnson was commenced. Second, the Affidavit of Ed and Mike 
Johnson was supported by Johnson's billing records, the most 
recent part of which was attached to Johnson's Complaint, which 
record showed Johnson's consistent practice of applying Thorn's 
payments first to accrued interest, and then to principle. 
The District Court would have erred had it ruled that 
a material question of fact existed with respect to the parties' 
course of dealings. In its pleadings, as well as at Oral Argu-
ment before the District Court, Thorn continually denied the 
existence of a formal, written contract. It never really address• 
ed the issue of the parties' course of dealings or commercial 
expectations which are recognized under the Utah Uniform Commer-
cial Code. At no time did Thorn, in its pleadings, by Affidavit, 
or in Oral Argument, refute the facts in Johnson's pleadings and 
Affidavit. Thorn avoided the issue of the parties' course of, 
dealings, and the District Court had no course but to conclude 
that the 18% interest rate on delinquent payments was part of 
the parties' agreement under Sections 70A-2-208 (relating to 
Course of Performance) and 70A-l-205 (relating to Course of 
Dealings and Trade Usage) of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code. 
-7-
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POINT FIVE: EVEN IF THE PARTIES' COURSE OF DEALINGS 
WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO ENTITLE JOHNSON TO IHTEREST A'l' THE RATE o 
18% PER ANNUM ON THE UNPAID BALANCE, THE PROVISION WITH RESPEC?. 
TO SUCH INTEREST BECAME PART OF THE PARTIES' AGREE!·IENT UNDER Tl 
PROVISIONS OF SECTION 70A-2-207 OF 'l'HE UTAH UNIFORM COMMERCIAL 
CODE. 
In its Counter-Appeal, Thorn alleges that the parties 
course of dealings is a material question of fact which would 
require a hearing to determine. Such a hearing, however, is 
unnecessary, since Section 70A-2-207 of the Utah Uniform Comme1 
cial Code makes the provision regarding the rate of interest pa 
of the parties' agreement. The argument made in Johnson' s Brie' 
with respect to the application of said Section regarding the i' 
provision for attorney's fees applies equally to the Provision/ 
regarding the rate of interest. 
The District Court erred in ruling that Johnson was 
not entitled to the terms of credit shown on its invoices, incl 
ing interest at the rate of 18% (as well as attorney's fees), 
' where such terms: (a) Are not restricted by the original offet 
(Thorn's Purchase Order); (b) Do not materially alter the 
Contract by creating surprise and undue hardship; and (c) were 
not objected to by Thorn within a reasonable time. 
-8-
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In short, interest and other teros of credit are 
exactly what the Legislature intended to be part of this agree-
ment under the terms of Section 70A-2-207 of the Utah Uniform 
Commercial Code, and the District Court had no grounds for 
concluding otherwise. 
-9-
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CONCLUSION f 
1. Principal Argument: The District Court improper1J 
disregarded Section 70A-2-207 of the Utah Uniform Commercial ~ 
Code both as to interest and attorney's fees. Since the record[ 
indicates that there was no material alteration of the parties'I 
agreement and that the defendant failed to object to the addi-
tional terms within a reasonable time, the terms of credit in 
the plaintiff's invoices are a binding part of the sales agree-
ment between the parties. This argument has been ignored by l 
Thorn in its pleadings, and oral argument before District Courtf. 
( 
and in its Brief before the Utah Supreme Court. ! 
2. Statutory Intent: Ti1e Utah Uniform Commercial I_ 
Code as a whole, particularly as reflected in Section 70A-2-710! 
thereof, was intended to make a non-breaching party whole and ~­
i 
to reimburse it for its commercially reasonable expenditures l 
Thorn 's Counter-Appeal ~ 3. Untimely Counter-Appeal: incurred in seeking its remedies. 
with respect to the 18% interest rate was not timely filed, andl, 
therefore should be dismissed. t 
I 
4. Course of Dealing: Thorn failed to give the Distr: · 
court sufficient refutation of the facts shown in Johnson's ( 
pleadings and Affidavit with respect to the parties' course of 
dealings concerning the allocation of Thorn's payments between 
-10-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
interest and principle. The evidence presented by Johnson was 
more than sufficient to preclude a nearing on that factual 
question, and Summary Judgment was appropriate. 
5. Interest Under Section 70A-2-207: Even if the 
parties' course of dealings was not sufficient to entitle 
Johnson to interest, the District Court erred in failing to 
apply Section 70A-2-207 of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code and 
to thereby make the provisions relating to interest part of the 
parties' agreement and enforceable by Johnson. 
-11-
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CERTIFICA'l'E OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing 
Reply Brief were served upon: 
Steven H. Stewart, Esq. 
220 South 200 East, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorney for Respondent & 
Cross-Appellant, Thorn, Inc. 
by mailing same, postage prepaid, this~~~-day of~~~~-
1980. 
LAYUE T. RUSHFORTH 
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